In this presentation, drawing on theoretical debates on transaction costs (Coase, 1937 ; Marglin, 1974 ; Brousseau, 1992 ; Bertrand, 2023), we propose a conceptual framework to better understand the precariousness of labor in the platform economy. After highlighting the conditions for the platformization of economic coordination, we demonstrate how platform capitalism enables firms to outsource labor. We demonstrate that labor in the platform era is subject to a double constraint: on the one hand, the pressure of price mechanisms and, on the other hand, dependence on and submission to hierarchy.

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